'fhis paper studies the (ormation of pricing rules in search markets. At a cost, eacb seller can commit himself to a fixed price. If he takes no actions to preclude haggling, his sales price is determined through bilateral negotiations with the buyer. The selection o( pricing rules exhibits strategic complementarities that may give rise to multiple equilibria. Differences in trading practices across countries and cultures may thus be consistent with equilibrium behavior. In bazaar markets, whcre tho buycr's cost of switching sellers is relatively low, most o( the trade is condurlod cia bargaining and prices are close to the perfectly competitive outcome.
I
1 Introduction I'hi. I,atK~r .InJir. Ihr f"nn:tt.iun of pricinR rulev in sFarrh market.s. f;arl,y work on sc,arch, inspin~~l by Stigler (19ti1) , (ocused on the question of how a consumer oughL lu .carrh upliiually whon arqniring pricc informatiou is costly. I~ollowiug liothschild's ll!lïa) criticistn Lhal. Lhesc~mudc~ls fail tu cxplain thc origiu of prices, thc scarch market literatnre has invcstigated two different principles of price determination. The first catcgory o( models asswnes that each seller posts a fixed price. The buyer then decides whether to accept this offer or to continue his search. Making a take-it-or-leave-it offer allows the se~ller to capture all the gains from trade. The most important implication of Lhis assumption is the famous`monopoly price paradox' of Diamond (1971) : As long as all buycrs havc search costs bounded away from zero, each seller will optimally charge the monopoly price. The eyuilibrium outcome is thus independent of the level of search costs. Thc second approach avoids this rather extreme prediction by studying bilateral negotiations as an alternative pricing rule. The seller and the buyer bargain about the pricc and sharo thc gains from trade. The buyer's bargaining position depends on his ability to find an alternativc seller and, therefore, his share of the surplus is negatively rclat.ed lo the~cost of se~arch. 't'he impact of this cost on the bargaining equilibrium has ba~n studic~d in thc standarcl scarch model by [3ester (1988) and in markets with bilateral search by Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985) .
Sincc thc two approaches have rather different implications regarding the relation bet.wcen scarch cost.s and e~quilibrium prices, they raise the question of which pricing mech-:niisnt niurr :,t,t,rul,ri:,LrIY~h~.cril,c~s a F;ivon~c~:uch ouviruu~nrul.. 'I'hix pap~-t' a,hlrc.aYC~w Lhi, pruhlciu by invc.~Ligat.in}; a nwdcl in which thc markeL participant.s cndogcnously solrct trading rnlos. In part.icular, we study how t.he process of price formation is affected Ly I hc Ic~vc~l of scarch costs.
Posting a take-it-or-leave-it price is not credible unless the seller has the ability to curnrnit hintsclf to his offcr. In t.he absence of cornmitment, if the buyer rejects the offer, iL is not in thc scller's intFrest to refuse to bargain. Following Schelling's (1956) analysis of t.hc conunit.mcnt. aspects of bargaining, commitme,nt can be~achieved by taking actions that mako it impossible to back down írom one's demand. Typically such actions are ro~tlc and .u an individual will commit himself only if the benefita outweigh the cost of conunitmcnt.' ('ontracting with an outside party is a simple device that the seller can use to prcveut bargaining. One possible strategy is to hire an intermediary or sales clerk, who is iustructed to sell the good at a fixed price. The posted price offer then becomes cmdiblc bccausc this agent is not authorized to negotiate price reductions.
It turus out that each individual seller's net benefit from committing to a fixed price depends on the commitment decisions of all the other sellers. This means that the selection of priciug rulcs constitutes a game between the sellers. This game exhibits strategic complemcntarity since each seller's incentive to prevent bargaining increases with the fraction of scllors who commit themsclves not to haggle? At least for some parameter constcllat.iuns, tliis tiupcnnoclular structurc gcncratcs mult.iple cquilibria. These equilibri:r dilfcr in t.hc, pricing rulc that. is adopted by the rnajority of Lraders. In reality Lradiug practim. uftcu di(fcr across countries and cultures. '1'he possibility of multiple cyuilibriunt uutcumcs i. consistcnt with this observation. Whcu ratioual bchavior shows no tenclcncy t.o climinatc one or the other pricing institution over time, historical and cultural factors rnay bccome important for the evolution of pricing institutions.3 'I'he analysis of markets with small search costs leads to some surprising results. In snch nrarkct.s Lhcrc always is an equilibrium in which only a minority of sellers charges n lixccl pric~, :cnJ tnua of thc Lradc i, couductrd via bargaining. 'fhal. ix, bargaining constitutes a viable pricing rule when the buyer's cost oí switching sellers is relatively low. In rcalily thc~lattcr coudition is probably sat.isfied in bazaar markets, where many stores oflcring close substitutes are located near one another. Our analysis shows that in tnarkcts with Ihcsc fcatures thc sellers have little to gain from committing to a fixed price. Anothcr implication is that equilibrium prices are close to the perfectly competil.ivc outcomc whcn search costs are small. The endogenous determination of trading rulcs thus csrapcs thc 'mouopoly price paradox'. I'hc t wu t rading rules dificr in the timing of price determination. In the posted pricing regirne prices arP fixed bejor~e the buyer enters a store. Negotiated pricing determines a price aJfcr the buyer has selected a seller. The relation between ex ante and ex post pricing is also studied in Gale (1988) , Peters (1991), and Bester (1993) . In these models ox ante pricing means that the buyer becomea informed about prices before he visits a sollcr. 'I'his is not thc casc here. As in the usual search model, the buyer forms rational expcct.at.ions about the distribution of prices; but he has to pay a cost to find out t.ho pricc' at a particular storc. '1'he commitment incentives of a monopolistic seller are iuwwtigatcd in Rilcy and 'l,cckhauser (1983) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1987) .
'I'hesc' aut.hurs cuusidcr a monopolist who searches for a customer. In our model the con,untcrs c~nt;:t~;r~in ze'arcó aud strategic interactions betwecn the sellers are the driving forcc' lichincl onr resnlts. 
In what. follows, we study equilibria where the consumers' price expectation is consistent with t.hc actual process of price determination.
Pricing Institutions
Ilow arc priccs dctcrmincd in search markets'? In this section we will brie(Iy explore two clilfomnl. pricin}; inst.itul.ions. In t.hc following sect.ion the detormination of the pricing rulc will bc cn~logc,nizod. A largc part of scarch thcxiry asswucs thxt thc scllcr couunita to a pricc bcJnrr Lhc buycr has ent.crcd t.hc storc. F,ffectively, the scller then makes a takc-it-or-Icavc-it pricc o(fcr. Let p,-dcnote the commitment price. If the buyer is not willing Lo pay t.his pricc, hc yuits and gets thc payoff v. 'I'herefore, he will certainly acccpt any price p; such that r-p~~v. As long as this inequality holds, the seller could increase p~slightly to increase profits. In eyuilibrium, the seller will quote a price such t.liaL thc buycr is indiffcrcut bctwc~c~n purcha.cing and quitting, but always buys at the pricc p~. Accordingly,
(2)
Gquations (1 ) and ('l) together with the rational expectations assumption p~-pr )ctermine thc search market equilibrium when all the sellers commit themselves to a price. It follows immediately that the equilibrium is unique with
I'ricc courmitnrrnL in combination with costly search allows the sellers to charge the consunicr's rescrvation valuation. This outcome is well-known as the Diamond (1971) mouolwly pricc paradox': Even in a market with many sellers the equilibrium price is t.he monopoly price, independently of the level of search costs.
Whcu thc~sc,llcr has not committed himself, the price is determined through bilateral Obviuusly, jr,. 1 jrb. '1'he scllers earn higher profits in the scenario where they commit the~nselves not to haggle. Notice that p~is independent of s and that ps decreases with s. If commitrnent can be obtained at some cost, this observation might lead to the conjecture that t.he profit from committing to a fixed price is inversely related to the level of search costs. '1'he posted price outcome would then appropriately describe markets witli relatively low search costs; negotiated pricing would predominate when search is r:rlher rusl.ly~. In what. folluws, it. t.urns out that. Lhis conjeetum is not valid in general.
In~hrcl, Ihe cuiuparisou bcl,w~r~u jr,. ancl jrb is misleadiug siuce Lhcae prices refer to two different cnvironments where al( the sellers employ the same exogenously given pricing nrechanisrn. 'l'he endogenous determination of pricing rules will show that the individual scller's gain from commitment depends on the other sellers' sales strategy. As a result, commitment decisions generate a game between the sellers and strategic interaction effecls may upset the intuition derived from equations (3) and (5).
The Commitment Game
We uor~~a~sinne t,hat cach individual seller can choose whether he wants to commit liiinself tu a fixcd price or not. "I'his decision is not conveyed Lo thc buycr before he have thr, samc cost k. The equilibrium determination of q is studied as a non-cooperative game br~t.wc~c~n t.he sellers. F.ach single seller takes q as fixed when he decides on his salr~s stratogy. In c~quilibriwn, q has then to be consistent with aggregate seller behavior.
Since commitment is profitable for all sellers with k G p~-pà, this leads to the following dcfinilion of rrtuilihriiun.
Definition: A conunilmrul equilibrium is a fraction q' of sellers such that q' -!'(l~'(v') -i~~(q')).
Wo (irsl. iin~c~sl.igato t.hc r,xistcncr~o( an cquilibrium q'. ll c q' c L 4Ve proceed by showing that rp(q) is non-decreasing in q. 13y (7) and (8) Sincc p' and py depend on the characteristics of the sellers and the buyers, also the cquilibrium y' is a fimction of these parameters. In the remainder, we discuss the properties of the equilibrium. In particular, we focus on the impact of the search cost s on y'.
Equilibrium Pricing Rules
A.pr~rial ralr~t;ury uf rvtnililrriunr uccurs whcu xll tór~sr,llrrs arlupl. t.hc satnc priciug tnr,chaniatn. "I'hc paranictcr constcllations that Icad t.o such an equilihrinm may help us to def.cnninc whcther one or the other pricing rule is more appropriate for the analysis uf a Kiven scarch cnvirontnr~nt..
Proposition 2: "I'hcrr i.v arc rquilibrium such Naal y' -0 iJ and only ij F(s) -0 or l~(O.~i(r -c)) -0. An cyuilibrium with q' -1 ezists iJ and only iJ F(0.5(r -c)) -I.
Proof: '1'here is an equilibrium with q' -0 if and only if 0-F(p~(0) -pb(0)).
Since p~(0) -pb(0) -min[0.5(r -c), s] and F(.) is non-decreasing, this is equivalent to min[!~'(.~). f~'(0.5(r -c))] -0.
'('herc is au oquilibrium with q' -1 if and only if 1-F(p~(1) -pb(1)). Since 
P~(y)-Pn(y)
Nulin~Ihal. yi I~~ndh to z~-ru as .v approaches zoro. If (`lr -r~]~4 G.9 G 1~4, there arc twu addilioual tiulution~, y1 and y3, with y2 -0.5 f 0.25 -s and q3 -0.5r.
For s~l~4 t.he unique equilibrium is given by q3. In this example the number of equilibria varies with s: The equilibrium is unique for low and high values of s; there are thme equilibria~~'hen .q lies in some intermediate range.
111ult.iple~,qnilihria arise due to a ccxirdination problem faced by the sellers. The individual se~ller has a weak incentive to prevent haggling about price as long as a large fracl.ion uf t.be ut.her sellers rely on ex post pricing. Conversely, he is less inclined to Lat't;ain wil.h 6i. custun~crn in a~uarkoL whcrr pusted pricing predoiuinatcs. As iu otlier gainrs wit.h strategic completnentarities, the different equilibria can be ranked according to the playcrs' welfare. All the sellers unanimously prefer a higher q' to a lower q'. But, non-ccxiperat.ive int.eracLions may cxhibit coordination failure so that the sellers may be stuck in an inferior equilibrium. The possibility of multiple equilibria indicates that rational choice does noL unambiguously predict the formation oí pricing rules. After all, historical and cultural factors may play an important role in the evolution and selection of cyuilibrium trading bchavior.
lutrn~slint;ly, an inLc,riur cquilibrium 0 G y' G 1 involves price disporsion cven though all t.he seller. offor thc same homogeneous good. With probability q' the buyer ends np at, a ston~wóerc he han Lo paY P~(9'): with probability 1-q' he has to spend only p~,(y') aflcr liaggling with Lhe~seller. Of course, the source of this price dispersion are dilfcrences in thc cost R:. As in other search models with identical buyers, there must be ..uiuc hclcrut;~~nrit~' :~~nun~;~cllen La Fenerate a dist.ribution of pricos.
'I'he alKw~, cs:~mplr alw rovoals t.liat genoral romparat.ive~sLal.ics results cannot bc obl.ained. Ind~Y~d, it n~ay happen that an increase in s lowers tbe value of y' iu one cquilibriunt wltile q' is incrcased in another cquilibrium. Nonetheless, the following I'rohosition sliows that one propcrty of the example can be generalized: When s beconu~s sntall, Lherc always is an eyuilibrium q' such that q' -~0 as s--~0. In thc equilibrium of our model, each cousumer visits exactly one store. 'I'here is uu repeated soarch. Agaiu, t.liis is duc to t.hc assumption of idcntical buycrs. lf scarch cosL di(fer, it rnay happen that only high-cost searchers buy the good from a seller who has committed himself to a fixed price. For a buyer with low search costs it may be advautageous to continue searching until he finds a store where the price is negotiable.
In such an euviromnent, equilibrium pricing rules might depend upon the distribution of search cost.s xcross consumers. 
